Anecdotes have emerged in the media about why state attorneys general run for higher office, but there have been no empirical examinations of why some attorney generals (AGs) run for higher office and others do not. I seek to answer two questions: first, what shapes political ambition among state AGs? Second, how do styles of policy making affect the likelihood of AGs running for higher office? I examine Rohde's assumption that all politicians have progressive ambition and analyze participation in multistate lawsuits as an influence on ambition. The findings indicate that AGs begin their service with varying levels of political ambition, but also that much of the media speculation is correct: AGs who are active in multistate litigation are also likely to run for higher office.
The question of why some politicians run for higher office while others do not continues to be an important question in political science. Since Joseph Schlesinger (1966) first wrote about political ambition and labeled the desire to move to higher office as ''progressive ambition,'' much fruitful research has emerged on the subject. Much of this research on political ambition has focused on legislative arenas, particularly the U.S. House of Representatives (Brace 1984; Rohde 1979) and state legislatures (Maestas , 2003 Maestas et al. 2006; Squire 1988a Squire , 1988b . However, the office of state attorney general (state AG) is increasingly recognized as a prominent springboard into various higher offices, most frequently, governor or U.S. senator (Mahtesian 1996) . Among state AGs starting service between 1988 and 2003 for whom we can clearly observe a decision to run for higher office, 73 out of 136 (fifty-four percent) ran for governor or senator. Fiftyfour percent represents a majority, but that still leaves forty-six percent that did not run, raising the question of why do some state AGs run for higher office while others do not?
A key debate within the ambition literature is whether politicians have inherently similar levels of progressive ambition. Some scholars have suggested that all politicians have progressive ambition, but they will only run for higher office when the benefits presented by the opportunity structure clearly outweigh the costs (e.g. Rohde 1979 ). Thus, if politicians are presented with the opportunity to advance to higher office without cost or risk, they will do so. More recent work has challenged this notion by suggesting that politicians evaluate the benefits of higher office against personal costs in the development of progressive ambition and, once they have decided that they are progressively ambitious, they make a separate decision, at a particular time, to run for higher office . Thus, this research relaxes the assumption that politicians have similar, inherent levels of progressive ambition. Additionally, research has emphasized that some offices serve to facilitate progressive ambition as institutional characteristics, such as legislative professionalism, make them better springboards into higher office (Squire 1988a (Squire , 1988b Maestas et al. 2006) . Thus, there is consensus that a variety of personal, political and institutional factors shape, facilitate or impede progressive ambition while serving in lower office, but there is greater disagreement over whether all politicians begin service in lower office as progressively ambitious individuals.
In this article, I examine the formation of ambition for state AGs, as well as how ambition is shaped during their service as AG. The question of how state AG ambition is shaped is an important one for three reasons. First, I argue that assumptions that have been made about progressive ambition in the literature need to be carefully examined in the case of state AGs. As Maestas et al. (2006) point out, it may be unreasonable to assume that all politicians have similar levels of progressive ambition prior to serving in lower office. However, the subjects of their study are state legislators, politicians whose levels of ambition may vary due to wide discrepancies in salary, resources and relative importance in the state political hierarchy. State AGs, on the other hand, occupy an office that nearly rivals the governor's office in terms of power and prestige, and to which many state legislators aspire. Thus, given that state AGs have already climbed to a high level in state government, it is more plausible to argue that they all have high levels of progressive ambition. Rather than make an assumption either way, I treat ambition formation as a separate empirical question, in need of investigation.
Second, the prevalence of using legislatures as case studies in studies of ambition produces opportunity structure variables that are nowhere to be found in a similar study of state AGs. For example, a state legislator in California can technically run for any of the more than fifty House seats that California has, even though he/she is likely to evaluate the probability of winning only a small number of seats. On the other hand, a state legislator in Alaska who wants to enter the U.S. House of Representatives can run for only one House seat. Furthermore, Rohde (1979) argues that in states where the governor serves two-year terms, House members are less likely to make a run for governor. With the progressive ambition of state AGs, such obvious yet distinctive characteristics of different opportunity structures do not exist, as every state has one governorship and two Senate seats, and only two states currently have two-year governorships (New Hampshire and Vermont). Thus, the traditional variables that have been used to mark different opportunity structures are not easily applied to studies of state AGs and it is necessary to seek other predictors of progressive ambition.
Finally, evaluating the determinants of AGs' pursuit of higher office allows us to examine the differences in policy-making styles between those who run for higher office and those who do not. An elected officer in all but seven states, 1 state AGs have broad authority to use their legal powers as they see fit (Ross 1990) , thereby enabling them to build a significant record of policy achievements and make a run for higher office. I argue that those state AGs who are particularly active and entrepreneurial policy makers are more likely to seek higher office later. In particular, given that consumer protection is one of an AG's primary responsibilities, AGs can potentially build a strong record of consumer protection in states where it is an important issue, 2 which can then be used as a springboard into higher office.
Specifically, I examine state AG participation in multistate consumer protection lawsuits and hypothesize that greater participation leads to bids for higher office. Additionally, frequent participation in such lawsuits by state AGs has been criticized by many conservative commentators, as a method of distributing political pork to citizens and state coffers, in order to set up a shot at the governorship or a senate seat (e.g. DeBow 2002; Gizzi 2005) . This claim can also be tested by examining the relationship between multistate lawsuit participation and progressive ambition. This article proceeds as follows. First, I review the literature on ambition, specifically the assumptions behind the formation of ambition, as well as the effects of policy-making behavior on ambition. In the process, I present the relevant variables for examining state AG ambition, distinguishing between variables that potentially influence inherent ambition (before AG service begins) from variables that shape ambition during AG service. I then present data and variables and explain how to test the competing sets of hypotheses. Finally, I present the results and the conclusion.
The Development of Progressive Ambition
In the political ambition literature, some scholars have suggested that all politicians have progressive ambition, but they run only when the benefits of running exceed the costs (Rohde 1979; Brace 1984; Abramson et al. 1987) , while other scholars suggest that there is first a stage in which politicians develop ambition and once this process has occurred, the ambitious then decide when to run . This debate began with Joseph Schlesinger's (1966, 6) seminal work on ambition, in which he stated that ''the central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals''. From this, Schlesinger theorized that politicians had either progressive ambition, static ambition (the desire to stay in one office) or discrete ambition (the desire to serve one term in one office).
David Rohde challenged Schlesinger's research and suggested that all politicians had progressive ambition: ''if a member of the House, on his first day of service, were offered a Senate seat or governorship, without cost or risk, he would take it'' (Rohde 1979, 3) . This assumption went largely unchallenged in the ambition literature until Maestas et al. (2006) argued that politicians have some probability of developing progressive ambition that depends on the perceived benefits of the higher office in question, as well as a variety of personal factors, such as age, gender, and family factors. Thus, once a politician has decided that he/she is progressively ambitious, he/she makes a separate decision on when to run for higher office. Whereas previous studies were typically able to measure ambition only by observing a decision to run, Maestas et al. (2006) utilized an innovative survey dataset that separately gauges the factors determining overall progressive ambition, as well as progressive ambition displayed in particular election cycles.
Given this previous research, it is essential to ask whether we can assume that state AGs all have progressive ambition or whether they have inherently different levels of ambition. The question is not a trivial one. Any statistical model examining the opportunity structure for higher office will yield biased results if the subjects of the study have inherently different levels of political ambition. The obvious advantage to the framework adopted by Maestas et al. (2006) is that it allows for the logical assumption that politicians may attach different values to work, career, and personal life. However, as stated in the introduction, this assumption is considerably more credible in the context of state legislators, a large pool of lower-level politicians that are unlikely to all have similar political aspirations. In the case of state AGs, some observers have suggested that the position nearly rivals the governor's office in terms of power and prestige (Greenblatt 2003) , which means that people who have attained the position have already risen to considerable heights through the state political structure. To reach such a level in politics requires a significant amount of ambition, which may mean that the assumption of universal progressive ambition is more plausible in the case of state AGs.
Rather than make assumptions, I attempt to test whether all state AGs are progressively ambitious or whether their levels of ambition display meaningful differences. In order to conduct such a test, it is necessary to separate predictors of ambition into ambition formation variables that may determine whether an AG has progressive ambition, from opportunity structure variables that may influence a decision to run at a given time. Thus, ambition formation variables are those that affect whether an AG has inherent progressive ambition while opportunity structure variables are those that have the potential to shape ambition during their service as AG. From there, two types of tests can be conducted. First, under the assumption that all state AGs have progressive ambition, all predictor variables can be evaluated separately, holding all else constant. In the second type of test, we would examine the effect of opportunity structure variables, conditioned on mediating variables that predict ambition formation. If state AGs have different inherent levels of ambition, we would then expect the predictors of ambition formation to have mediating effects on the opportunity structure variables. In other words, the effects of opportunity structure variables on the probability of running for higher office would vary, depending on the values of different ambition formation predictors. In the next two sections, I discuss factors related to ambition formation (prior to AG service) and opportunity structure (during AG service), respectively.
Formation of Ambition
There are several factors worthy of analysis in determining whether state AGs have different inherent levels of political ambition. In their analysis of state legislators, Maestas et al. (2006) find that older legislators and female legislators are both less likely to be progressively ambitious than their younger, male counterparts. Brace (1984) also finds that age has a dampening effect on progressive ambition for House members looking to higher office, but Jensen and Martinek (2009) interestingly find that female state court judges have greater ambition than do male state court judges. Despite the findings by Jensen and Martinek, overall the literature suggests that if age and gender do have an effect on ambition formation, being older or female deter the formation of progressive ambition.
Additionally, the method of selection of state AGs may also be an important factor. AGs are appointed in seven states and because candidates for these offices do not have to endure an election campaign in order to attain the position, they may be less attracted to electoral politics in the future. It is reasonable to expect that in the pool of state AGs those who run for governor or senator are more likely to be the ones who already have experience running an electoral campaign. Additionally, as elected officers in forty-three states, most AGs have an incentive to be responsive to constituent needs, which in turn can fuel a bid for higher office. From this perspective, AG candidates with progressive ambition are attracted to elected offices, thereby displaying inherently different levels of ambition from candidates that are attracted to appointed offices. On the other hand, several state AGs started their careers in important appointed positions. A prominent example is Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama, who served as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Alabama before being elected to the office of Alabama AG in 1994. From this perspective, the method of selection is more of an opportunity structure When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? variable which may shape ambition during AG service, but does not necessarily influence the initial formation of progressive ambition.
Policy Making and Progressive Ambition
In the previous section, I discussed whether state AGs have progressive ambition when they begin their terms as AG. In this section, I focus on the factors that shape ambition during AG tenure. Specifically, the opportunities available to state AGs to run for higher office are no doubt significant, but the policy making environment of each state is also important. AGs will attempt to shape policy in ways that are more likely to translate into electoral rewards later on. Moreover, AGs have a great deal of latitude in pursuing their policy objectives, as they have the authority to act as they see fit, in the public interest (Ross 1990) . In all fifty states, this authority is known either as common law authority or as parens patriae authority.
3 Some observers have gone as far as to argue that the office of AG may be as powerful than governor, because while governors need to marshal coalitions and legislative support to pass their agenda state AGs need no one's approval or support to investigate and try cases (Greenblatt 2003) . Into this context of powerful public attorneys fits neatly the responsibility for enforcing consumer protection laws. Consumer protection, an issue over which state AGs have primary jurisdiction, has also become more salient to state AGs since the early 1980s (Ross 1990; Clayton 1994) . One reason for the attention being paid to consumer protection is the rise in prominence of multistate litigation. Multistate lawsuits are prosecutorial actions brought jointly by any number of states against businesses for violating state consumer protection or antitrust laws. 4 These lawsuits emerged partly because the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 allowed states to sue companies in federal court as parens patriae. However, state AGs were also responding to a perceived weakening of federal regulatory enforcement (Clayton 1994; Ross 1990; Zimmerman 1998; Lynch 2001 ). Many state AGs saw an absence of leadership from the Federal Trade Commission, so they began prosecuting consumer protection cases against large businesses together. Working together made sense because, this way, AGs could pool resources against wealthy business interests that could otherwise legally ''outgun'' state AGs on their own. Moreover, many businesses had expanded their operations across the nation, so fighting them in one state at a time made little sense. By the late 1980s, state AGs were filing these lawsuits with greater and greater frequency, to the point that by the 1990s multistate lawsuits became institutionalized as a tool for enforcing consumer protection regulations at the national level. 5 The use of multistate litigation also became more frequent, as state AGs were emboldened by the multibillion dollar tobacco settlement, reached in 1998.
In the context of political ambition, the use of multistate lawsuits as a policy tool has the potential to tell us a great deal about who runs for higher office and who does not. First, the rate at which each state participates in these lawsuits varies considerably. While the number of lawsuits overall has gradually increased over time, there are specific state-level and case-level factors that cause each state's level of participation to vary, often substantially (Spill et al. 2001; Bowman 2004; Provost 2006, forthcoming) . This fact is important, as previous research has demonstrated that more active policy makers are often the ones who exhibit progressive ambition. For example, in an early study, Swinerton (1968) found in his survey of 46 state-level, subexecutive office holders that the executives with progressive ambition were more likely to get involved in the state's partisan political activities than were the other executives. Herrick and Moore (1993) found that U.S. House members who exhibit progressive ambition are more active in almost every element of legislative policy making than are House members who exhibit intra-institutional ambition-the desire to ascend to leadership positions within the House of Representatives. Wawro creates an ''index of entrepreneurship'' for House members and finds that entrepreneurial House members do not necessarily pursue higher office more than other House members, but they do pursue House leadership positions more than other House members (2000). 6 There is a scarcity of empirical research documenting patterns of ambition among state AGs, yet anecdotal evidence suggests that AGs who are more active in their policy making have progressive ambition. The degree to which AGs are able to be active policy makers in a particular area depends on whether they can successfully exploit the political environment. Generally, we can expect AGs to push hard on issues for which they feel confident they will get support from the electorate and from state elites. For example, many state AGs from more conservative states have had success in defending their states' strict abortion laws. During much of his tenure as Nebraska AG, Don Stenberg fought against rules from the Clinton Administration which mandated that the state fund abortions in cases of rape or incest and he also defended Nebraska's partial birth abortion law before the Supreme Court in Stenberg vs. Carhart (2000) . Missouri has also proven to be fertile ground for defending strict abortion laws as former AGs John Danforth, John Ashcroft and William Webster all defended Missouri abortion laws before the Supreme Court. Stenberg, Danforth, Ashcroft and Webster all went on to run for governor or senator.
Moreover, Krislov (1959) has written about the complexities of the positions taken by Southern AGs in the 1950s and 1960s, complexities often borne by their desire to run for higher office. In Alabama, every AG serving between 1955 and 1979 not only ran for governor but also played a role in the evolution of southern racial relations. For example, John Patterson, who served from 1955 to 1959, earned a reputation as an anticivil rights crusader after he banned the National When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor?
Association for the Advancement of Colored People from operating in the state and took legal action against black communities that boycotted Tuskegee businesses and Montgomery buses (Alabama Department of Archives and History). With the backing of the state's segregationists and the Ku Klux Klan, he was elected governor in 1958. Patterson's successors in the AG office, Richmond Flowers and William Baxley initiated high-profile, procivil rights prosecutions, and both later ran for governor, although both were unsuccessful.
These anecdotes indicate that multistate litigation is only one of many methods by which state AGs can influence policy. However, multistate litigation represents well the robust policy making capacity of state AGs as it has risen in salience as a tool of regulatory enforcement. Consequently, since AGs began prosecuting multistate cases in order to fill the perceived void of regulatory enforcement left by the Reagan Administration, consumer protection has become a potentially entrepreneurial issue for AGs, on which they can build a run for higher office. Indeed, many conservative commentators have criticized state AG participation in multistate lawsuits as legal settlements which are distributed as political pork to citizens and into state coffers (e.g. DeBow 2002; Gizzi 2005) . Regardless, however, of whether multistate lawsuits are good policy, they do allow state AGs to build a record of policy accomplishment, which looks particularly good in states that value consumer protection. 7 Thus, I hypothesize that the more active state AGs are in multistate litigation, the more likely they are to run for higher office.
Data and Variables
In order to test my hypotheses on AG political ambition, I gathered data on all state AGs who began their service between 1988 and 2003. Of course, the question of AG ambition prior to 1988 is interesting, but I only examine those AGs for whom there are systematically collected data for multistate lawsuits from 1988 onwards. The dependent variable is AG progressive ambition which is measured by whether an AG ran for governor or U.S. Senator in his/her state. 8 AGs who announced candidacies for higher office, but then dropped out of the race are counted as running for higher office, as are AGs who have announced candidacies for future races, as of this writing. AGs who served for one year or less are excluded from the sample for two reasons. First, such AGs are typically appointed to serve the rest of another AG's unexpired term and second such AGs have far fewer opportunities and less time to get involved in multistate litigation when they serve for such short periods. Thus, the unit of analysis is the state AG and the resulting sample is 136 AGs for whom we can observe the decision to run for governor or senator. 9 Among these 136 AGs, 73 (about fifty-four percent) ran for higher office.
Among the independent variables, I analyze three variables that may explain ambition formation prior to AG service and two variables that deal with the opportunity structures that AGs face while in office. First, in order to tap into the personal characteristics that may weigh on the potential to develop progressive ambition, I include both gender and age. Gender is simply a dichotomous variable indicating whether an AG is female (20 of the 136 AGs analyzed are female), while the age variable represents the age of a state AG at the time he/she began service as an AG.
10 Finally, I also include a dichotomous variable for the AG method of selection, which simply indicates whether the AG is elected or appointed. There are three opportunity structure variables that serve to potentially shape ambition during AG service. Finally, the measure of policy making is each AG's participation rate in multistate consumer protection lawsuits. This measure is created by taking the number of lawsuits each AG joined and dividing it by the number of lawsuits the AG potentially could have joined, i.e. the total number of lawsuits initiated during that AG's tenure. 13 The data on multistate lawsuits used for this study come from four monthly publications released by the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG): Consumer Protection Report, Antitrust Report, Attorney General Bulletin, and Telemarketing Fraud Bulletin. With these publications, I was able to collect information on all multistate lawsuits settled between 1988 and 2005. Information includes who the defendant was, the alleged infraction, the terms of the settlement and which states participated. For those AGs for whom we can observe a decision to run for higher office, their potential to join multistate lawsuits ends at the end of the year in which they run for higher office. 14 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all the aforementioned variables and in the next section I describe the methods by which I analyze the interplay of these variables.
Data Analysis
In order to estimate the effects of the independent variables on progressive ambition for state AGs, I estimate a series of logit models. Recall that one of the puzzles to be answered in this study is whether state AGs all have progressive ambition when they begin their service as state AG. If we believe that they all begin with progressive ambition, then we can simply evaluate the effect of each predictor variable on the probability of running for higher office, holding all else constant.
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However, if this assumption is not plausible, two questions must be answered. First, what factors determine the levels of progressive ambition that AGs have when they begin their service, and second how do these factors interact with policy making factors that ultimately also play a role in the decision to run for higher office? Because the extant literature on ambition is not sufficient to tell us which assumptions to make regarding state AGs, I account for both possibilities. In the first model, I work with the assumption that all state AGs have progressive ambition and simply estimate the independent effect of each variable on the decision to run for higher office. In the next set of models, I relax this assumption, acknowledging that coefficient estimates for variables such as the number of open seats and participation in multistate litigation may vary. The reason for this is simple: if state AGs have different inherent levels of progressive ambition then the effect of variables that may influence progressive ambition during AG service (opportunity structure variables) will vary across AGs. Age, gender, and method of selection are all variables that may affect the level of progressive ambition prior to the start of AG service, and thus may also mediate the effects of multistate litigation participation as well as the presence of open seats. In order to test for these possibilities, I include interaction terms in the second set of models that account for the potential mediating effects of the ambition formation variables (age, gender, and method of selection) on the relationship between the opportunity structure variables (open seats, term limits, and multistate litigation) and progressive ambition. 15 Thus, in the interaction term models, I account for the possibility that the effect of opportunity structure variables on ambition may be different for older, female or appointed AGs.
Results Table 2 presents the results for the simple model which works on the assumption that all state AGs are progressively ambitious. Higher rates of participation in multistate litigation do increase the probability of a bid for governor or senator, thus indicating that the more active policy makers are also the more ambitious politicians. Among the personal characteristics, age is insignificant and being a female does reduce the likelihood of running for higher office, although the effect is only significant at the level of p50.10. These non-existent and weak effects, respectively, provide preliminary support for the idea that all AGs have inherent progressive ambition. Concordant with prior expectations, state AGs are also more likely to run for higher office when they are elected and when they face open seat opportunities for governor or senator. However, the presence of AG term limits has no significant impact on the decision to run for higher office. In the next set of models, I examine whether the ambition formation variables have conditioning effects on multistate litigation participation and the presence of open seats. Table 3 presents four separate models in which age, gender and method of selection are all interacted with the number of open seats and multistate litigation participation rate. The objective here is to evaluate how the effects of multistate litigation, open seats, and term limits on progressive ambition change as the mediating effects of age, gender, and method of selection are incorporated. If there is no change in the effects on ambition as we move from, for example, male to female then that suggests that gender has no significant effect on the formation of progressive ambition. If there is an intervening effect, on the other hand, it suggests that males and females have inherently different levels of progressive ambition. The proposed tests are broken down into four separate models here, as multicollinearity poses more of a threat when all component and interaction terms are included in one model, especially when there are only 136 observations. Additionally, when component terms are included in multiple interaction terms, it makes interpretation much more challenging. Thus, the tests are drawn out across four models.
In model 1, the common component of the interaction terms is gender, which makes it the mediating variable in progressive ambition's relationship with multistate litigation participation and open seats. In assessing the effect of policy making on ambition, the multistate litigation coefficient of 1.686, while only significant at the level of p50.10, does indicate that higher rates of multistate litigation participation do increase the probability of male AGs running for higher office. To examine the effect for females, I add the multistate litigation coefficient (1.686) to the interaction term coefficient (0.285), which produces a coefficient estimate of 1.971. After calculating the standard error (2.225), I find that the effect of multistate litigation participation on progressive ambition for females does not achieve statistical significance. Thus, while the effect is not remarkably strong for male AGs, greater participation in multistate litigation is still more likely to yield a run for higher office among male AGs than among female AGs.
As in table 2, elected AGs are significantly more likely to exhibit progressive ambition, while age has no significant impact. Term limits proves to have no significant effect, for males or females. The coefficient for open seats (0.928) indicates that the presence of open seats has a significant and increasing effect on the probability of male AGs running for higher office, but is there a similar effect for female AGs? Adding the open seat variable coefficient (0.928) to the coefficient of the gender/open seat interaction term (1.019) yields a coefficient estimate of 1.947, with a calculated standard error of 1.127, which is significant at p50.05. Thus, overall the effect of open seats is significant, but there is little shift in the effect as we move from male to female AGs.
Model 2 examines the potential mediating effect of age on progressive ambition. Because age is a continuous variable, it is necessary to calculate coefficients and standard errors for various values across the range of age values, as the mediating effect may be significant only for particular ages. In order to assess the potential significance of age as a conditioning variable, I calculate coefficients and standard errors for the minimum and maximum age values, as well as the values at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles. Given that there are 136 observations in the dataset, this translates to observation numbers one, 34, 68, 102, and 136, which represent the ages of 31, 39, 43, 48, and 63.
The component term for multistate litigation is not significant, but it represents the effect of multistate litigation on ambition for an AG who is zero-year old, which makes no sense substantively. The coefficient on the interaction term has a negative sign, indicating that if there is a significant effect age has a negative, yet small, mediating effect on the relationship between multistate litigation participation and progressive ambition. Adding the component coefficient to the interaction term coefficient produces a coefficient estimate of 2.54. Calculating the standard errors for each of the age values (31, 39, 43, 48, and 63) , the mediating effect of age is strongly significant for all age values, but 63. Overall, this indicates that participation in multistate litigation has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of running for higher office, but this effect gradually diminishes as AGs become older. However, this diminishing effect disappears for the oldest AGs in the sample. Not surprisingly, model 2 also shows, as does model 1, that elected AGs are more likely to run for higher office. Model 2 also presents the unconditional effect of gender on ambition, indicating that female AGs are significantly less likely to run for governor or senator than are male AGs. As in model 1, there is no effect of term limits on ambition, as the coefficient is insignificant for all values of age.
The effect of open seats is highly significant, but again, this is for the substantively meaningless cases in which AGs have not yet been born. Factoring in the interaction term yields a significant, yet slightly negative, effect of age on the relationship between open seats and ambition (8.712 À 0.170 ¼ 8.542 ). This indicates that open seats have a strong, positive effect on progressive ambition among younger AGs, but this effect gradually diminishes in strength as AGs get older. Thus, overall, models 1 and 2 tell us that age and gender do have some mediating effects on the relationships between other predictor variables and progressive ambition. This tells us that state AGs may have different inherent levels of progressive ambition, as determined by factors such as age and gender.
Models 3 and 4 examine the predictors of ambition, utilizing AG method of selection as the conditioning variable. As with models 1 and 2, method of selection is interacted with multistate litigation participation and presence of open seats, but each interaction term is treated in its own model, as the high proportion of elected AGs causes a high level of multicollinearity when both interaction terms are included in one model. Recall that there is no interaction term for method of selection and term limits due to the lack of variation in term limits for appointed AGs. Model 3 provides the unconditional effect of multistate litigation, which is positive and significant, providing further evidence that more active policy makers are more likely to seek higher office. As does model 2, model 3 indicates that female AGs are less likely to aspire to higher office than male AGs, but there is no evidence that age has an impact on progressive ambition. The open seats variable by itself represents the effect of open seats on progressive ambition for appointed AGs, and this effect is strong and statistically significant, due to the fact that the few appointed AGs that ran for higher office did so in the presence of an open seat. Because elected AGs dominate the population of cases and experience more variation as a result, the effect of open seats is not as strong for appointed AGs (1.906À0.897 ¼ 1.009), but it is still strong overall and statistically significant.
Finally, model 4 not only confirms the findings from other models but also breaks down further the relationship between policy making and progressive ambition. The coefficient on multistate litigation participation by itself is insignificant, indicating that it does not affect ambition for appointed AGs, but examining the effect for elected AGs produces a coefficient of 1.974, with a standard error of 0.863, indicating that participation in multistate lawsuits has a strong and statistically significant effect on progressive ambition for elected AGs. Thus, method of selection has conditioning effects on the relationships between the other predictor variables and progressive ambition. Perhaps not surprisingly, greater participation in multistate litigation enhances the likelihood of a bid for higher office among elected AGs, but not appointed ones. Elected AGs have stronger incentives to be responsive to constituents than do appointed AGs and previous research has demonstrated that elected officials are typically more active policy makers than are appointed ones (Swinerton 1968; Gormley 1983; Besley and Coate 2000; Provost 2006 ).
The coefficients in the models of table 3 indicate whether certain predictor variables have absolute and/or conditional effects on progressive ambition. However, these coefficients do not provide any information about their respective magnitudes. For this, it is necessary to calculate predicted probabilities, generated by the coefficients. Because the primary research focus is the effect of policy making on progressive ambition, I choose to examine how probabilities vary across different rates of participation in multistate litigation. Drawing on the coefficients generated in model 4, I also vary the values of gender, method of selection and open seats, but I do not incorporate age, as its effects are statistically insignificant in model 4. Moreover, although statistically significant, the substantive effects of age in model 2 are not particularly strong. Finally, because the potential mediating effect of method of selection on the relationship between policy making and ambition is not significant for appointed AGs, I only consider the cases of elected AGs. Table 4 presents the predicted probabilities of AGs running for higher office. I consider the cases of male and female AGs, and the presence or absence of open seats while manipulating the values of multistate lawsuit participation. The values of multistate lawsuit participation evaluated here are the minimum (0), the mean (0.36), and the maximum (0.88). Male AGs who participate in multistate lawsuits 88 percent of the time and who face an open seat in a senate or gubernatorial election are the most likely to run for higher office. Specifically, such an AG stands a 93 percent chance of running for higher office. Shifting the lawsuit participation rate to the minimum of zero percent still yields a fairly high overall probability, 71 percent. However, when the same AG does not face an open seat, the probability of running plummets to 45 percent thus illustrating the importance of open seats.
Female AGs have overall lower probabilities of running for higher office than do male AGs. However, it should not be forgotten that a small number of the AGs analyzed here-20 of 136-are female. Participating in multistate lawsuits has 
Discussion
The results of this study provide us with two important findings. First, state AGs that participate actively in multistate litigation are more likely to later seek the governorship or a senate seat. This finding supports previous studies which find a link between active, involved policy making and progressive ambition, yet this is the first study to demonstrate such a relationship for state AGs. As a result, we can claim with confidence that entrepreneurial AGs are more likely to exhibit progressive ambition than less active AGs. Moreover, the findings vindicate to some extent, the claims by some observers that state AGs participate in multistate litigation in order to position themselves for a run at higher office. Complementing this finding is the set of conditions imposed on the relationship between policy making and progressive ambition. The results in table 3 indicate that not all state AGs necessarily begin their service with the same level of ambition. The factors that drive this inherent level of ambition, in turn, have mediating effects on the relationship between policy making and ambition. For example, active participation in multistate litigation is likely to affect progressive ambition for male AGs, but not for female AGs. Similarly, age has a small and diminishing effect on the relationship between policy making and ambition. However, the strongest of these mediating effects is AG method of selection. Elected AGs who frequently participate in multistate litigation are very likely to run for higher office, but the same condition does not hold for appointed AGs. The fact that gender and method of selection have an impact on ambition formation suggests that Rohde's assumption that all politicians have progressive ambition may not be an accurate one. Maestas et al. (2006) found that numerous factors, including age and gender, influence the initial formation of progressive ambition and the findings in this study provide support for that idea.
Finally, it should be noted that these findings are largely exploratory. This study is the first to analyze systematically political ambition among state AGs, but there is still significant room for improvement in studies of this nature. First, as previous studies on state legislatures have found significant effects between legislative professionalism and progressive ambition there may also be effects between professionalism of AG offices and progressive ambition, but much work needs to be done on developing systematic measures of financial and personnel resources among state AG offices. Second, with more complete data on office characteristics, future studies can also examine the decisions of some state AGs to pursue judicial positions, such as state and federal judgeships, rather than executive or legislative positions. Greater knowledge of office characteristics will also help in explaining why some AGs, such as Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Darrell McGraw Jr of West Virginia make the office a career position. Some of the reasons may be idiosyncratic and personal, depending on the AG, but better understanding of the office characteristics, perhaps coupled with survey data, will help to strengthen theories of AG ambition, and political ambition more generally. 10. Many studies posit a curvilinear (u-shaped) effect of age on a particular dependent variable, in which age has positive and negative effects. Such effects are captured by an age variable, as well as an age-squared variable. Here, given that the youngest AGs (youngest is 31) are not that young, and they have already reached the office of state AG, I hypothesize a gradual reductive effect of age, as a mediating variable, and thus I do not include an age-squared variable.
11. As a measure of the size of the potential pool of senate and gubernatorial candidates in a state, I had originally included the number of elected, executive state officials, but in every model tested its effect was highly insignificant. Thus, it was dropped from the model, as an irrelevant variable.
12. Because appointed AGs serve at the pleasure of the governor, I count them as term limited. A different possibility would be to interact term limits with method of selection, but given the extensive presence of interaction terms already in the model (see the Data Analysis section), this would require the introduction of three-way interaction terms, which would increase the probability of collinearity problems while reducing degrees of freedom in a model of 136 observations. Additionally, although Nevada now limits its AGs to three terms, I count this as not term limited because of its high ceiling and because it is unusual for AGs to serve more than three terms.
13. Because not all state AGs start their service in the same years, nor do they all serve for the same number of years, the number of lawsuits that each AG can potentially join varies. For example, AGs that served from 1988 through 1990 only had 18 lawsuits to potentially join, while AGs who served two terms from 1991 through 1998 could have joined 85. Most importantly, however, the number of lawsuits is not fewer than 18 for any given AG, thus the measure provides a reliable number of potential lawsuits. 15. No interaction term is included for term limits and method of selection. Because appointed AGs are counted as term limited (see note 12), there is no variation within appointed AGs which makes any statistical test of this interaction term impossible.
